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Attribute-based encryption (ABE) for cloud computing access control is reviewed in this article. A taxon-
omy and comprehensive assessment criteria of ABE are first proposed. In the taxonomy, ABE schemes are
assorted into key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) schemes, ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes, anti-quantum
ABE schemes, and generic constructions. In accordance with cryptographically functional features, CP-ABE
is further divided into nine subcategories with regard to basic functionality, revocation, accountability, pol-
icy hiding, policy updating, multi-authority, hierarchy, offline computation, and outsourced computation. In
addition, a systematical methodology for discussing and comparing existing ABE schemes is proposed. For
KP-ABE and each type of CP-ABE, the corresponding access control scenario is presented and explained by
concrete examples. Specifically, the syntax of ABE is given followed by the adversarial model and security
goals. ABE schemes are discussed according to the design strategies and special features and are compared in
the light of the proposed assessment criteria with respect to security and performance. Compared to related
state-of-the-art survey papers, this article not only provides a broader 12 categories of ABE schemes, but also
makes a more comprehensive and holistic comparison. Finally, a number of open research challenges in ABE
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1 INTRODUCTION
As an attractive computing paradigm, cloud computing enables the on-demand provision of di-
verse resources exemplified by computation power and storage over the Internet, which liberates
enterprises from the maintenance of IT infrastructures and the management of data centers to
concentrate on their core businesses. In addition, cloud computing enables individuals to enjoy a
variety of powerful resources in a pay-as-you-consume fashion. Usually, cloud computing comes
into three service models in practice, including the public, the private, and the hybrid clouds. An in-
creasing number of organizations and individuals are choosing the public cloud because of greater
flexibility, operation cost savings, and better customer support. It is forecast by Gartner [20] that
the public cloud service market worldwide will grow from $182.4B in the year 2018 to $331.2B
in the year 2022. Nevertheless, security concerns and privacy issues have become the dominating
hindrance on the road to the wider adoption of cloud computing. Indeed, the trusting domain of
third-party cloud storage servers is usually different from that of users, and hence users are reluc-
tant to subscribe to cloud service to outsource their important data. According to the top five cloud
computing predictions for 2020 by Techfunnel [86], security comes in first as the cloud’s biggest
challenge.
In cloud computing, as depicted in Figure 1, to realize that only authorized users have the right
to access the data, either the symmetric encryption technology or the traditional public-key en-
cryption technology can be used. However, when a new data user (DU) enters into the symmetric
encryption-based access control system, the data owner (DO) has to share with the new DU a
secret key that acts as a shared key and is applied to encrypt the DO’s data again. Similarly, in
the traditional public-key encryption-based access control, the DO is required to encrypt his data
again via the new DU’s public key PK3, which is different from the public keys PK1 and PK2 of
the original DUs. Obviously, these two access control mechanisms lack flexibility and scalability,
because either shared secret keys or public keys are required for the DO to outsource his data
to the cloud. Flexibility and scalability refer to the expressiveness of access control policies and
the impact of newly joined data users on the access control system, respectively. Fortunately, the
attribute-based encryption (ABE) technology plays a key role in realizing access control systems
with fine granularity and scalability. As shown in the ABE-enabled access control mechanism in
Figure 1, the flexible attributes are embedded into the ciphertext and the DO does not need to
know the identities of specific DUs before encryption. When a new DU joins the system, DOs are
not affected and do not have to do anything. Therefore, both flexibility and scalability are enabled
in the ABE-enabled access control system.
Sahai and Waters [81] introduced the ABE notion for the first time. As a promising crypto-
graphic primitive, ABE has successfully attracted considerable research efforts, and it comes in
two categories. The first is ciphertext-policy ABE, which is often abbreviated as CP-ABE; and the
second category is key-policy ABE, which is often abbreviated as KP-ABE.
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Fig. 1. Different access control mechanisms in cloud computing.
In CP-ABE, a user’s attribute secret key is associated with an attribute list, and a ciphertext spec-
ifies an access policy that is defined over an attribute universe of the system. A ciphertext can be
decrypted by a user if and only if the user’s attribute list matches the ciphertext’s access policy. Let
us consider an application scenario of a teaching information system in a university. The attribute
universe of the system is {Identity, Department, Year} where Identity={Teacher, Student},
Department={CS: Computer Science, CE: Communication Engineering, etc.}, and Year={Year 1, Year
2, Year 3, Year 4}. In this system, suppose there are some confidential records of students’ grades
for the computer system course encrypted under the access policy ((Identity: Student AND De-
partment: CS) OR Identity: Teacher). Then, the plaintext can only be recovered by students in
the CS department or by teachers. For example, the user Alice with the attribute list {Identity:
Student, Department: CE, Year: Year 1} cannot decrypt the ciphertext, while the user Tom with
the attribute list {Identity: Teacher} is capable of decrypting the ciphertext.
In KP-ABE, an access policy, which is defined over the system’s attribute universe, is encoded
into a user’s attribute secret key and a ciphertext is created with respect to an attribute list. A ci-
phertext can be decrypted by a user if and only if the corresponding attribute list matches the access
policy associated with the user’s attribute secret key. For instance, if the access policy ((Identity:
Student AND Department: CS) OR Identity: Teacher) is encoded into the user Bob’s attribute
secret key, then Bob fails to decrypt a ciphertext, which is computed based on the attribute list
{Identity: Student, Department: CE, Year: Year 3}. Whereas, Bob would be able to decrypt a
ciphertext with respect to {Identity: Teacher}.
Because of the high expressiveness and scalability of ABE-enabled access control on outsourced
cloud data, many researchers have put their efforts into ABE. However, CP-ABE has gained much
more attention than KP-ABE. The reason lies in that the access policy determination in CP-ABE
is put on the data owner’s hand. According to the requirements of access control in different ap-
plication scenarios, CP-ABE schemes are further divided into many categories. In fact, the design
of existing ABE schemes has become increasingly sophisticated to achieve various functional fea-
tures. Furthermore, researchers usually assert the advantages of their ABE schemes while ignoring
the drawbacks. Due to the lack of clear and comprehensive assessment criteria of ABE, existing
ABE schemes cannot be evaluated and compared in terms of security and performance in a fair
manner.
Although there have been surveys on ABE studies [2, 32, 84], the survey in Reference [2] focuses
on revocation in CP-ABE, which is one of the categories reviewed in this article, and the ABE
surveys in References [32, 84] are restricted to narrow scopes and lack comprehensive assessment
criteria.
To help the readers systemically perceive the core design of distinct ABE schemes and facilitate
ABE’s applications to cloud computing access control, this article presents a solid and compre-
hensive survey of ABE in the setting of cloud computing access control. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
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• First, a clear taxonomy and comprehensive assessment criteria of ABE are proposed. Ac-
cording to the taxonomy, ABE is categorized into KP-ABE, CP-ABE, anti-quantum ABE, and
generic ABE constructions, in which CP-ABE has received the most attention of researchers.
• Second, in accordance with cryptographically functional features, CP-ABE schemes are
further classified into basic CP-ABE constructions, revocable CP-ABE constructions, ac-
countable CP-ABE constructions, policy-hiding CP-ABE constructions, CP-ABE construc-
tions with policy updating, multi-authority CP-ABE constructions, hierarchical CP-ABE
constructions, online/offline CP-ABE constructions, and outsourced CP-ABE constructions.
• Third, a systematical methodology for discussing and comparing existing ABE schemes is
proposed. To be specific, for KP-ABE and each type of CP-ABE, the ABE-based access con-
trol application scenario is first presented and explained by typical examples. Then, the
syntax of the specific type of ABE is given, which is followed by the adversarial model
and security goals. Furthermore, the state-of-the-art for this type of ABE is reviewed by
analyzing the design strategies and special features in detail. Finally, a comprehensive com-
parison is made in terms of the proposed assessment criteria with respect to security and
performance.
• Last, a number of open research challenges are highlighted in the light of our observations
on the state-of-the-art of ABE.
This survey article aims to help the non-specialists comprehend ABE systematically and benefit
the researchers to keep up with the state-of-the-art technologies of ABE. Compared to the existing
ABE surveys, our article not only provides a broader 12 categories of ABE schemes, but also makes
a more comprehensive comparison based on the design strategies and special features. In addition,
we point out the ABE solutions for each proposed cloud computing access control scenario and
identify open challenges for future ABE research. This survey is expected to help practitioners to
determine suitable ABE schemes and inspire researchers to explore customized ABE designs for
particular cloud computing access control scenarios.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the taxonomy and assessment
criteria of ABE. Following the taxonomy, different types of CP-ABE solutions are sequentially re-
viewed in the subsequent nine sections (Section 3 to Section 11). Concluding remarks are made in
Section 12. Due to space limitation, more details of hierarchical CP-ABE, online/offline CP-ABE,
and outsourced CP-ABE are given in the Supplemental Material A, the Supplemental Material B,
and the Supplemental Material C, respectively. Additionally, we review KP-ABE in the Supplemen-
tal Material D. Finally, both anti-quantum ABE and generic ABE constructions are reviewed in the
Supplemental Material E.
2 TAXONOMY AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA OF ABE
2.1 Taxonomy of ABE
The proposed taxonomy of ABE is illustrated in Figure 2. During the rest of the article, we will
mainly review basic CP-ABE, enhanced CP-ABE, and KP-ABE. Different from basic CP-ABE, en-
hanced CP-ABE further realizes other cryptographically functional features. These features can
be relevant to attribute secret keys, access policies, attribute authorities, and computation effi-
ciency. According to the features, enhanced CP-ABE schemes are divided into the following eight
categories:
• Revocable CP-ABE. The functionality of revocation is realized in revocable CP-ABE. Accord-
ing to the graininess, revocation mechanisms fall into user revocation and attribute revo-
cation. However, in the light of the effect to non-revoked users, revocation mechanisms are
divided into indirect revocation and direct revocation.
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of ABE.
• Accountable CP-ABE. The functionality of accountability is realized in accountable CP-ABE.
Both the user traceability and the attribute authority accountability are involved in ac-
countable CP-ABE. According to the given conditions, accountability mechanisms fall into
white-box accountability and black-box accountability.
• Policy-hiding CP-ABE. Access policy privacy protection is further enabled in policy-hiding
CP-ABE schemes.
• CP-ABE with Policy Updating. In basic CP-ABE, it is impossible to change a ciphertext’s
access policy. Considering access control in emergencies, CP-ABE with policy updating
can be adopted to update the access policy in an involved ciphertext.
• Multi-authority CP-ABE. With this type of CP-ABE construction, distributed access privilege
can be realized. According to whether a central authority exists or not, multi-authority
CP-ABE schemes are divided into centralized multi-authority CP-ABE constructions and
decentralized multi-authority CP-ABE constructions.
• Hierarchical CP-ABE. As for hierarchical CP-ABE constructions, the delegation of access
privilege is organized in a hierarchical manner.
• Online/offline CP-ABE. To alleviate the computation burden of data owners and the attribute
authority, online/offline CP-ABE is designed, which can realize offline encryption or offline
key generation.
• Outsourced CP-ABE. To support data users (respectively, data owers and the authority) with
constrained computation resources, outsourced CP-ABE is proposed to outsource labori-
ous computation in decryption (respectively, encryption and key generation) to third-party
servers.
2.2 Assessment Criteria of ABE
For a systematic comparison of existing ABE schemes, we present the assessment criteria of ABE
with respect to security and performance. It is noted that the assessment criteria are proposed for
fairly evaluating the properties claimed in different ABE schemes.
2.2.1 Security Assessment Criteria. As we know, different types of ABE schemes have distinct
security goals, which will be explained in the corresponding section later. The fundamental secu-
rity goals of ABE include data confidentiality and collusion resistance. Furthermore, a particular
type of ABE scheme usually has its own special security properties. For instance, backward se-
crecy and forward secrecy are usually considered in revocable ABE, and accountability should be
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enabled in accountable ABE. In addition, for different types of ABE schemes, data confidentiality
and collusion resistance are usually realized under diverse conditions, which are reflected in the
Type of Adversaries, the Security Model, and Complexity Assumptions involved in the security anal-
ysis. A multitude of ABE schemes may realize the same security goals under diverse conditions
such as different security models. Whereas, researchers usually assert the security advantages of
their ABE schemes while ignoring the drawbacks such as a weak security model.
For the fairness of security comparisons, this survey article proposes the security assessment cri-
teria of ABE, including Types of Adversaries, Security Model, and Complexity Assumption, whereas
giving security properties in the subsection named Adversarial Model and Security Goals of the
concrete type of ABE.
• Types of Adversaries. Selective adversaries and adaptive adversaries are two typical types of
adversaries considered in ABE. The adaptive adversary does not need to specify its target
access policy or attribute list in advance and hence is stronger than the selective adversary.
If an ABE scheme is proven secure against selective (respectively, adaptive) adversaries, it
is said to achieve selective (respectively, full) security. Because the target access policy or
attribute list is not specified in advance, full security proofs are technically more challenging
than selective security proofs, because challengers cannot set the parameters in a targeted
manner in the process of simulation.
• Security Model. For one thing, if generic groups are involved in an ABE scheme’s security
proofs, it is considered that the scheme has security in generic group models. For another,
according to whether random oracles are used in the security analysis, the security mod-
els are categorized into the standard model (STM) and the random oracle model (ROM).
In the concrete security analysis of an ABE scheme, non-generic groups are better than
generic groups, and standard models are preferable to random oracle models. In fact, the
security proofs in non-generic groups and STMs are technically more challenging, because
the challengers have limited ability in the process of simulation compared with the case of
generic groups and ROMs. It is noted that the generic group model and the ROM are not
comparable, which is explained as follows:
—First, the generic group model means that no property other than equality of group ele-
ments can be directly tested by adversaries. In other words, the adversaries cannot per-
form most of the group operations themselves and have to rely on queries to obtain the
operation results. Please refer to References [7, 83] for more details.
—Second, the ROM means that random oracles are involved in the model. A random oracle
is a black box that responds to each query by giving a random value chosen uniformly
from its output domain. If a query is repeated, it returns the same value as before. Please
refer to Reference [4] for more details.
—Last, there are indeed ABE schemes [5, 88, 100] that are proven secure with the generic
group model and the ROM involved simultaneously.
• Complexity Assumption. An ABE scheme’s security is usually reduced to the adopted com-
plexity assumptions. It is more desirable to prove the security under the recognized as-
sumptions, of which the form is concise and the complexity is proved. The security proofs
under complexity assumptions of concise forms are technically challenging, because fewer
parameters are provided by the assumption instance and used by the challengers.
2.2.2 Performance Assessment Criteria. In the following, we present the performance assess-
ment criteria. Note that the typical communication and storage costs can be adequately evaluated
by the criteria.
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• System Public Key Size. This parameter is relevant to the storage overhead. The system public
key size of many ABE solutions is linearly proportional to some parameters exemplified by
the attribute number in the access control system. It would be better if the system public
key is kept constant-size in ABE.
• Ciphertext Size. The ciphertext size is related to the communication and storage costs in
ABE-enabled access control systems. In many ABE solutions, the size of ciphertexts usu-
ally linearly expands with the associated access policy complexity. It is desirable if an ABE
scheme has a ciphertext of constant size.
• Attribute Secret Key Size. The attribute secret key size is related to the storage cost in ABE-
enabled access control systems. In many ABE solutions, the size of attribute secret keys is
linearly proportional to the number of involved attributes. It is desirable if an ABE scheme
has a constant-size attribute secret key.
• Computation Cost. Both the encryption cost and the decryption cost should be taken into
account, because users may be resource-limited in cloud computing. In addition, differ-
ent kinds of CP-ABE schemes have their own exclusive computation cost. For revocable
CP-ABE, the server-side computation cost may exist. The accountability computation cost
should be considered in accountable CP-ABE. In policy-hiding CP-ABE, the decryption com-
putation overhead comprises the matching process cost and the decryption process cost. In
CP-ABE with policy updating, the update server-side computation cost is involved. For on-
line/offline CP-ABE solutions, both the key generation cost and the encryption cost take the
forms of the cost in the offline process and the cost in the online process. Furthermore, the
user-side decryption cost should also be taken into consideration. In outsourced CP-ABE,
besides the attribute authority’s key generation cost and the data user’s decryption cost, the
computation cost outsourced to the key generation service provider should also be consid-
ered besides the cost of the decryption service provider. It is worth noting that the bilinear
pairing (pair) is the most expensive cryptographic operation. Besides bilinear pairings, the
exponentiation (exp) and the point multiplication (pm) usually should be considered regard-
ing the computation cost. Compared with pair, exp, and pm, the basic arithmetic operations
such as the multiplication and addition are usually ignored in the analysis on computation
cost [27, 74, 76]. Therefore, as for the computation cost, we give a detailed analysis in terms
of the expensive cryptographic operations including pair, exp, and pm.
• Expressiveness. The expressiveness of ABE is reflected in the access policy, which represents
the graininess of the access control system. In existing ABE schemes, there are many kinds
of access policies, such as the linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) policy, tree policies, and
threshold policies. The LSSS-based schemes are more efficient compared with the schemes
based on the other policies while maintaining equivalent expressiveness.
• Group. The groups involved in ABE are divided into prime-order groups and composite-
order groups according to the group order. It is noted that the prime-order ABE construc-
tion is more desirable than the composite-order ABE construction from the viewpoint of
efficiencies. However, if full security is required, the design of prime-order ABE is techni-
cally more challenging than that of composite-order ABE, because the methodology for full
security proofs usually relies on composite-order groups.
• Attribute Universe. The attribute universe in ABE is categorized into large universe, semi-
large universe, and small universe. In large universe ABE, the system public key size is not
affected by the attribute universe size, and there is no limitation on the number of attributes
with regard to a ciphertext. The semi-large universe means that the system public key size is
not affected by the attribute universe size, while the number of attributes applied to describe
a ciphertext is upper bounded. The small universe means that the system public key size is
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Fig. 3. The application scenario of basic CP-ABE.
related to the total attribute number in the system. Specifically, large universe ABE is most
desirable, because it improves the flexibility of the corresponding access control system in
the system initialization.
3 BASIC CP-ABE
3.1 Application Scenario: Basic Fine-grained Access Control
As depicted in Figure 3, fine-grained access control mechanisms can be achieved with in virtue of
basic CP-ABE. The access control system involves four parties, including the cloud service provider
(CSP), the attribute authority (AA), the DO, and the DU. As a fully trusted entity, the AA publishes
the system public keys (procedure (1)) and issues attribute secret keys to each DU based on his/her
corresponding attribute list (procedure (2)). The DO chooses an access policy A himself and in-
tegrates A into the ciphertext (procedure (3)). Then, the DU has the means for decrypting the
ciphertext to retrieve the original data based on his/her attribute secret keys (procedure (4)). A
successful decryption relies on the matching between the embedded attribute list and the attached
access policy. For example, as shown in Figure 3, we denote the school of computer science by CS
and the school of communication engineering by CE. If A=(Teacher OR (CS AND Student)), then
the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted by DUs with attribute lists LA = {Teacher, Alice} and
LB = {CS, Student, Bob}, respectively, while it cannot be decrypted by the DU with attribute list
LC = {CE, Student, Carl}.
3.2 Syntax of Basic CP-ABE
In a basic CP-ABE scheme, there are four algorithms acting as main ingredients:
• Setup(1λ )→ (PK ,MK ): This algorithm is called the system setup algorithm and it will be
run by the AA at the beginning. After inputting a security parameter λ, the algorithm re-
turns system public keys PK and master keys MK .
• KeyGen(PK ,MK ,L) → SKL : It is called the attribute key generation algorithm, which will
be performed by the AA. The AA takes PK , MK , and L as inputs, where L is an attribute
list, and returns SKL as the attribute secret key corresponding to L.
• Encrypt(PK ,M,A) → CTA: This algorithm is called the encryption algorithm, which will
be performed by the DO. The DO first chooses an access policy A for the target message
M , and then takes as inputs PK , M, and A. The algorithm outputs a ciphertext CTA of M
associated with A, which will be stored on the CSP.
• Decrypt(PK ,CTA, SKL )→ M or⊥: This algorithm is called the decryption algorithm, which
will be run by the DU. After inputting PK , a ciphertext CTA of M with A, and an attribute
secret key SKL corresponding to L, the algorithm returns M if L matches A (denoted by
L |= A), and otherwise outputs the error symbol ⊥ to indicate a failure of decryption.
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3.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
In basic CP-ABE enabled access control systems, the AA is a fully trusted entity. As an honest-but-
curious party, the CSP honestly executes the procedures of the system but tries to obtain secret
information from ciphertexts on the cloud as much as possible.
• Data Confidentiality. In secure access control systems, if a DU is an unauthorized user, it
should be blocked from decrypting the ciphertext, because his/her attributes fail to match
the access policy. Additionally, the CSP should not be allowed to decrypt ciphertexts without
authorization. For example, supposeA=((CE AND Teacher) OR (CS AND Student)), then the
ciphertext can be decrypted by the DU with LA = {CE, Teacher, Alice} but not by the DU
with LB = {CE, Student, Bob}.
• Collusion Resistance. The access control system should ensure data confidentiality against
collusion attacks from unauthorized DUs and the CSP. Specifically, even if many mali-
cious DUs and the CSP collude to decrypt the ciphertext by integrating attribute secret
keys, they cannot succeed if none of them can individually succeed in decryption. For
example, suppose A=((CE AND Teacher) OR (CS AND Student)), then the ciphertext can
be decrypted neither by the DU with LA = {CS, Teacher, Alice} nor by the DU with LB =
{CE, Student, Bob}. In particular, even if the DUs with LA and LB combine their attribute
secret keys together, the ciphertext under A still cannot be successfully decrypted by them.
3.4 Research Status of Basic CP-ABE
Sahai and Waters [81] applied the secret-sharing technique to design two fuzzy identity-based
encryption schemes. The schemes support threshold access policies and are proved selectively
secure. As a small universe scheme, the security proof of the first one relies on the decisional
modified bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DMBDH) assumption. The other one is a semi-large universe
solution involving the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
For the first time, Bethencourt et al. [5] developed a CP-ABE solution that allows tree-based
access policies. In this scheme, a novel attribute secret key randomization technique is adopted to
realize collusion-resistance, in which a two-level random masking methodology acts as the key
ingredient. However, the scheme only obtains security in the sense of generic group models.
Cheung and Newport [12] designed a basic CP-ABE solution in which AND gate policies with
two attributes, i.e., AND∗+,−, are allowed. Under the DBDH assumption, the chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) security of the basic solution is given in standard models. Furthermore, they combine
the basic scheme and one-time signatures to obtain an enhanced scheme, which can resist the
chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). They also adopt the idea of hierarchical attributes to raise
the performance of the basic scheme. However, the limitation of the AND gate access policy is
the lack of expressiveness.
To tackle the issues of expressiveness and security proof together, Goyal et al. [21] designed a
tree-based CP-ABE solution. The scheme suffers from severe efficiency drawbacks due to the copies
of each attribute for every position in the access tree. For reducing the computation burden during
the processes of encryption and decryption, Liang et al. [51] designed a new bounded CP-ABE solu-
tion of which security proofs are given in standard models under the DBDH assumption. However,
the computation efficiency still needs to be improved and the attribute universe is small. Lewko
et al. [37] developed a CP-ABE construction that achieves full security under three new static as-
sumptions. The composite group is involved in the scheme and the efficiency needs to be improved.
In the above schemes, the access policy complexity has negative influence in the performance
because of the linear increasing of the ciphertext size. Herranz et al. [24] designed a CP-ABE
solution with ciphertexts of constant length. The scheme’s CPA security is obtained in standard
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models under a static assumption. According to the computation cost, the threshold-based CP-
ABE solution due to Susilo et al. [85] is more efficient than Reference [24] because of the constant
length of ciphertexts. However, the expressiveness of these schemes remains to be improved to
some extent. Waters [93] designed a CP-ABE solution in which LSSS can be utilized to describe
access policies. The security analysis of this scheme involves the q-type assumption, where q is
related to the access policy complexity. Lewko and Waters [39] presented a new methodology for
proving full security based on the technique for selective security. They further designed a CP-
ABE scheme with full security based on Reference [93], in which the group order is composite and
involves three primes.
The attributes in the above schemes need to be enumerated in the system setup phase. To re-
move this restriction, Rouselakis and Waters [78] designed a CP-ABE solution with a large universe
and LSSS access policies. The scheme follows the partitioning methodology and is proven secure
against selective adversaries under q-type assumptions. To further improve the performance of
CP-ABE, a CP-ABE solution is developed by Zhang et al. [115], in which the ciphertext size and
the computation overhead are constant. Based on Reference [115], a data sharing mechanism with
fine granularity is enabled in mobile clouds [116], which supports the access policy AND∗m by
allowing wildcards and multiple values of attributes. Malluhi et al. [65] developed an LSSS-based
CP-ABE construction with efficient decryption, and the scheme is proven secure against selec-
tive adversaries under a q-type assumption. In ROM, Agrawal and Chase [1] designed a CP-ABE
solution and gave its full security under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. Xue et al. [97]
designed a tree-based CP-ABE mechanism that supports attribute comparison and the scheme’s
security proofs involve the DBDH assumption. Okamoto and Takashima [72] proposed a func-
tional encryption solution with full security in which CP-ABE acts as a special instance. Even if
the scheme is designed in prime order groups, it suffers from the drawbacks of complex design
and low performance, because dual pairing vector spaces are involved.
3.5 Comparison of Basic CP-ABE Schemes
A comparison is made in Table 1 to analyze basic CP-ABE constructions with regard to the size
of the system public key |PK |, the size of the ciphertext |CT |, the size of the attribute secret key
|SK |, the computation efficiencies of encryption and decryption, the policy, the type of group, the
attribute universe, the security model and the underlying complexity assumption. Table 1 demon-
strates that the scheme of Reference [115] is most efficient with regard to the computation over-
head and hence is proper for mobile users, while the access policy is less expressive. The policies
of these schemes can be AND-gate policies [12, 115], threshold policies [24, 81, 85], tree polices [5,
21, 51, 97], and LSSS policies [1, 37, 39, 65, 78, 93]. In expressive LSSS-based schemes, the scheme
of Reference [65] is computationally more efficient than the others. However, the scheme involves
a non-static assumption in the security analysis. Full security is obtained only by the schemes of
References [1, 37, 39] in which the schemes of References [37, 39] are proven secure in standard
models. Although proven secure in the ROM, the scheme of Reference [1] simultaneously supports
the LSSS access policy, large universe, static assumption, and the number of pairings involved in
decryption is constant. Therefore, if full security, expressiveness, and decryption efficiency are
required simultaneously, the scheme of Reference [1] is a preferred choice.
4 REVOCABLE CP-ABE
4.1 Application Scenario: Revocable Fine-grained Access Control
Revocable CP-ABE is utilized to enable revocable access control with fine granularity, which is
demonstrated in Figure 4. Similar to the case of basic CP-ABE, the revocable access control sys-
tem involves the AA, the CSP, the DO, and the DU. It is noted that revocation mechanisms in
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Fig. 4. The application scenario of revocable CP-ABE.
CP-ABE include direct revocation and indirect revocation. The difference lies in whether the non-
revoked DU’s secret key should be updated when a revocation event1 occurs. In direct revocation,
non-revoked DUs will not be affected by revocation events, and an entity revocation server (RS)
is additionally added that is untrustworthy and used to enable the revocation mechanism. In re-
vocable CP-ABE, the DU can successfully retrieve the original data by decrypting the ciphertext
through his/her secret key if the access policy is met by the attribute list and the DU is (respec-
tively, required attributes are) not revoked in the setting of user (respectively, attribute) revocation.
Because concrete revocation mechanisms usually have different technical details, for ease of un-
derstanding, we focus on typical revocation solutions.
In the case of direct revocation as depicted in Figure 4(a), after publishing the system public
keys (procedure (1)), the attribute list and identity of the DU is integrated into the attribute secret
key by the AA (procedure (2)). In particular, the CSP obtains a ciphertext update key to update
previous ciphertexts (procedure (3)) and the revocation list is further attached by the DO to the
ciphertext (procedure (4)) [3, 28, 109]. The DU obtains the ciphertext from the CSP and it can finally
decrypt the ciphertext only if the access policy is matched by his/her attribute list and necessary
attributes are not revoked (procedure (5)). For instance, as shown in Figure 4(a), A=(Teacher OR
(CS AND Student)). Even if LB matches A, the ciphertext cannot be decrypted by the DU with
LB = {CS, Student, Bob} when the attribute Student is revoked.
In the case of indirect revocation as depicted in Figure 4(b), after publishing the system public
keys (procedure (1)), the attribute list and identity of the DU is integrated into the long-term secret
key by the AA (procedure (2.1)). Based on the long-term secret key, the DU can further generate the
short-term secret key (procedure (2.2)). In addition, the RS obtains the long-term transformation
key (procedure (3)) and key update information (procedure (4)) from the AA [76]. The DO generates
the ciphertext and uploads it to the CSP (procedure (5)). The DU obtains the ciphertext from the
CSP and sends it to the RS (procedures (6.1) and (6.2)). Based on the long-term transformation
key and key update information, the RS generates a short-term transformation key (procedure (7))
that is utilized to transform a ciphertext to a partially decrypted ciphertex (procedure (8)). Based
on the short-term secret key, the DU can decrypt the partially decrypted ciphertext only if the
access policy is matched by his/her attribute list and necessary attributes are not revoked. A new
revocation list will be published by the AA once revocation events occur (procedure (9)).
1A revocation event means revoking a user or some attributes of a user.
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4.2 Syntax of Revocable CP-ABE
A directly revocable CP-ABE scheme comprises algorithms including Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt,
UKeyGen, CTUpdate, and Decrypt.2 For algorithms Setup and KeyGen, the specifications are the
same as those of basic CP-ABE, we only give other different algorithms as below.
• Encrypt(PK ,M,A,R )→ CTA: The DO runs the encryption algorithm. After inputting PK ,
M , A, which is chosen by the DO, and the attribute revocation information R, which spec-
ifies the identities and attributes involved in revocation events, it outputs a ciphertextCTA
of M under A, which will be stored on the CSP.
• UKeyGen(PK ,MK ,R (k ) )→ (PP (k ) ,UK (k ) ): This algorithm is called the update key genera-
tion algorithm, which will be performed by the AA. After inputting PK ,MK , and revocation
information R (k ) , which is published by the AA for the kth revocation event, this algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP (k ) and the corresponding ciphertext update keyUK (k ) as-
sociated with R (k ) . Then, the AA makes PP (k ) public and securely sendsUK (k ) to the CSP.
• CTUpdate(PK ,CTA,UK (k ),R (k ) ) → CT ′A: This algorithm is called the ciphertext update
algorithm, and it will be run by the CSP. The inputs include PK ,CTA,UK
(k ) , and R (k ) , and
the output is an updated ciphertext CT ′A associated with CTA.
• Decrypt(PK , PP ,CTA, SKL )→ M or⊥: The DU runs the decryption algorithm. On input PK ,
the public parameter PP , which is introduced by revocation events so far, CTA of M under
A, and a secret key SKL with regard to L, it returns M if L |= A and the DU’s corresponding
attributes are not revoked, and outputs the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
For indirectly revocable CP-ABE [76], there are nine algorithms: Setup, UserKG, TranKU,
TranKG, DecKG, Encrypt, Transform, Decrypt, and Revoke. Because the definitions of Setup,
DecKG, Encrypt, and Decrypt are similar to those of Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt of
basic CP-ABE, we only give other different algorithms in the following:
• UserKG(PK ,MK , ID,L, st ) → (PKI D , SKI D ): It is called the user key generation algorithm,
which will be performed by the AA. After inputting PK , MK , the user’s identity ID, the
user’s attribute list L, and the state st , the algorithm returns the long-term transformation
key PKI D and long-term secret key SKI D , which are, respectively, sent to the RS via public
channels and the user through a secure channel.
• TranKU(PK ,MK , t , rl , st )→ (KUt , st ′): This algorithm is called the transformation key up-
date algorithm, and it will be run by the AA. After inputting PK , MK , t , which is a time
period, rl , which is used to denote revocation lists and a state st , the algorithm returns KUt
as a key update message and st ′ as a new state. Finally, the AA sends KUt to the RS.
• TranKG(PK , ID, PKI D ,KUt ) → TKI D,t : The RS will run this algorithm, which is used to
generate transformation keys. It takes as inputs PK , ID, PKI D , and KUt and outputs a time-
based short-term transformation key TKI D,t associated with ID and the time period t .
• Transform(PK , ID,L,TKI D,t ,CTA) → CT ′A or ⊥: The CSP runs this algorithm, which is
called the ciphertext update algorithm. The inputs include PK , ID, L, TKI D,t , and CTA,
and the output is an updated ciphertextCT ′A associated withCTA if L |= A, and in the time
period t the identity ID has not been revoked. Otherwise, it outputs the error symbol ⊥ to
indicate the failure of the transformation.
2Different from References [28, 109], the algorithms UKeyGen and CTUpdate are not involved in Reference [3], because
the backward secrecy is not considered.
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• Revoke(PK , t , rl , st ) → rl ′: This algorithm is called the revocation algorithm, which is per-
formed by the AA. On inputs PK , t , rl , and st , the algorithm returns rl ′ as a new revocation
list.
4.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
Revocable CP-ABE is favorable for designing revocable access control systems in which the AA is
fully trustworthy. The CSP and the RS are honest-but-curious. Similar to basic CP-ABE, revoca-
ble CP-ABE should also satisfy Data Confidentiality and Collusion Resistance. In addition, because
revocation is taken into account, Backward Secrecy and Forward Secrecy should be realized in revo-
cable access control systems. Backward secrecy and forward secrecy mean that a data user should
be prevented from decrypting the previous and subsequent ciphertexts, respectively, if his/her
attributes required in decryption are revoked.
For example, suppose A=(Teacher OR (CS AND Student)), then the ciphertext can be decrypted
by the DU with LA = {CS, Teacher, Alice} and the DU with LB = {CS, Student, Bob} individually.
However, if the attribute CS of LB is revoked, then Bob cannot decrypt the previous ciphertext after
ciphertext updating and all subsequent ciphertexts associated with A. However, if the attribute CS
of LA is revoked, Alice can still successfully decrypt all the ciphertexts associated with A.
4.4 Research Status of Revocable CP-ABE
Attrapadung and Imai [3] designed two CP-ABE schemes that realize direct revocation and the
LSSS policy based on the basic CP-ABE technique and broadcast encryption. In a broadcast en-
cryption scheme [18], the data owner as a broadcaster encrypts a message for a target set of data
users. Any data user in the set can decrypt the ciphertext based on his/her secret key to get the
message. Even if all data users outside of the set collude, they cannot obtain the message. The idea
of direct revocation is removing the identity list of involved users from the target set of broadcast
encryption. Hence, only user revocation is realized in these schemes. Furthermore, the schemes
only support small universe and are proven secure under q-type assumptions.
An AND-gate policy CP-ABE solution is proposed by Yu et al. [104] and the security analysis
involves the DBDH assumption. The scheme realizes indirect attribute and user revocation via the
combination of proxy re-encryption and CP-ABE. In a proxy re-encryption scheme [6], a semi-
trusted proxy can transform or re-encrypt a ciphertext corresponding one public key to a new
ciphertext associated with another public key without having access to the underlying plaintext
or secret keys. Hur and Noh [28] designed a tree-based CP-ABE solution in which indirect user
and attribute revocation mechanisms are realized. The key technique in the scheme is a stateless
group key distribution method based on binary trees. Under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
assumption, the scheme is said to achieve backward secrecy and forward secrecy. However, the
authors only provided informal security analysis. A similar scheme can be found in Reference [27].
Yang et al. [99] designed a CP-ABE solution with the LSSS access policy, and its security proofs are
given under the q-type assumption in the ROM. The scheme enables indirect attribute and user
revocation based on the ciphertext update mechanism, which is performed by a third-party server.
Motivated by Reference [80], Lee et al. [36] proposed self-updatable encryption (SUE), which is
a new primitive and involves time-evolution and key-revocation mechanisms. Based on SUE, the
authors further constructed a revocable CP-ABE solution, which supports the LSSS access policy
and realizes direct user revocation. Phuong et al. [74] developed a new CP-ABE construction that
realizes direct user revocation based on broadcast encryption. The scheme has constant size cipher-
texts while only AND-gate policies are allowed. Yang et al. [100] enabled direct user revocation in
tree-based CP-ABE by keeping a proxy decryption key list in the server. In the scheme, each data
owner has to generate master secret keys and corresponding system public parameters. Liu et al.
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[54] realized direct user revocation mechanisms for LSSS-based CP-ABE schemes by embedding a
time period value and a revocation list into the ciphertext.
To realize direct attribute revocation, Zhang et al. [109] first designed an auxiliary function that
can be used to specify and update the revocation related ciphertexts. Then, the authors developed
a revocable CP-ABE construction based on the auxiliary function. The scheme enables direct at-
tribute and user revocation, in which the ciphertext length is small and constant. However, it only
supports the AND-gate policy and selective security. Fan et al. [17] designed a tree-based CP-ABE
solution that enables dynamic membership management with arbitrary states. The scheme enables
direct attribute and user revocation by adaptively updating the system public key.
Cui et al. [14] designed a CP-ABE solution in with users can be revoked in an indirect manner.
In the scheme, an untrusted server can help non-revoked users to transform ciphertexts. Qin et al.
[76] and Xu et al. [95] further considered the decryption key exposure issue and proposed CP-
ABE schemes with indirect user revocation. Note that the schemes of References [14, 76] achieve
constant-size attribute secret keys by introducing a server to help data users in decryption. The
CP-ABE solution due to Li et al. [44] can prevent collusion attacks from revoked users and non-
revoked users and enable indirect attribute revocation. The security proofs are given under the
divisible computational Diffie-Hellman (DCDH) assumption.
4.5 Comparison of Revocable CP-ABE Schemes
In Table 2, we compare revocable CP-ABE solutions in the light of the same metrics as those
used in the comparison of basic CP-ABE. In addition, we add a new metric “server-side computa-
tion cost” in Table 2. Obviously, the scheme of Reference [28] has the smallest system public key
and the scheme of Reference [109] has the shortest ciphertext. The schemes of References [3, 14,
36, 54, 76, 95, 99] support LSSS policies, the schemes of References [17, 28, 44, 100] support tree
policies, and the schemes of References [74, 104, 109] allow AND-gate policies. The schemes of
References [14, 76, 100] are very efficient considering the user-side decryption cost, because the
laborious computation tasks are outsourced to the server. However, these schemes cannot realize
attribute revocation. The schemes of References [28, 44, 99, 104] realize indirect attribute revoca-
tion. Based on the state-of-the-art for revocable CP-ABE, we know only the schemes of References
[17, 109] enable direct attribute revocation and direct user revocation simultaneously. Note that
the scheme of Reference [109] achieves selective security and Reference [17] is fully secure in
standard models. Therefore, if both full security and fine-grained direct revocation mechanisms
are required, the scheme of Reference [17] can be adopted.
Table 3 further compares the special features of revocable CP-ABE constructions. To be specific,
the comparison is made based on Key Technique, Backward Secrecy, Forward Secrecy, Re-keying
Computation Cost, and Re-keying Storage Cost. We know that all the schemes of References [3,
14, 17, 28, 36, 44, 54, 74, 76, 95, 99, 100, 104, 109] realize forward secrecy, and only the schemes
of References [14, 76, 100] simultaneously realize backward secrecy and forward secrecy without
needing re-keying. In these schemes, the key technique is proxy-assisted decryption, which needs a
proxy for decryption. Generally, it remains an open problem to design attribute directly-revocable
LSSS-based CP-ABE schemes with backward and forward secrecy.
5 ACCOUNTABLE CP-ABE
5.1 Application Scenario: Accountable Fine-grained Access Control
Access control mechanisms with fine granularity and accountability can be achieved through ac-
countable CP-ABE, as shown in Figure 5. Usually, the system involves five entities: the AA, the CSP,
the DO, the DU, and the auditor. The CSP, the DO, and the DU play the same roles as those in basic
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 53, No. 4, Article 83. Publication date: August 2020.
83:16 Y. Zhang et al.
T
a
b
le
2.
T
h
e
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
o
f
R
ev
o
ca
b
le
C
P
-A
B
E
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
s
Sc
h
em
es
P
ar
am
et
er
Si
ze
U
se
r-
Si
d
e
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
C
o
st
Se
rv
er
-S
id
e
P
o
li
cy
G
ro
u
p
U
n
iv
er
se
Se
cu
ri
ty
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
|P
K
|
|C
T
|
|S
K
|
E
n
cr
y
p
ti
o
n
D
ec
ry
p
ti
o
n
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
C
o
st
A
I0
9a
-1
[3
]
(m
1
+
2u
+
1
)|G
|
(n
1
+
2
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(
+
2
)|G
|
(2
I
+
3
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
3
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
-
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
se
m
i-
L
ar
g
e
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
A
I0
9a
-2
[3
]
(m
1
+
7
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(n
1
+
2r
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(
+
4
)|G
|
(2
n
1
+
3r
+
2
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
2r
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
(I
+
r
)e
x
p
-
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
se
m
i-
L
ar
g
e
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
Y
W
R
L
[1
04
]
(3
n
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(n
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2
n
+
1
)|G
|
(n
+
2
)e
x
p
(n
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
n
e
x
p
n
e
x
p
A
N
D
∗ +,
−
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
S-
ST
M
D
B
D
H
H
N
[2
8]
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2
I
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2

+
1
)|G
|+
lo
g

|Z
∗ p
|
(2
I
+
2
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
(I
+
lo
g

)e
x
p
I
e
x
p
T
re
e
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
-
B
D
H
Y
JR
[9
9]
(2
n
+
4
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(3
n
1
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2

+
2
)|G
|
(5
n
1
+
2
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
2e
x
p
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
S-
R
O
M
q
-t
y
p
e
L
C
L
+
[3
6]
(n
+
4d
m
ax
+
5
)|G
1
|+
3
|G
T
|
(2
d
m
ax
+
2
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
3

(d
m
ax
+
1
)|G
3
|
(3
n
1
+
3d
m
ax
+
5
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
d
m
ax
+
3
)p
a
ir
+
(I
+
2
)e
x
p
4e
x
p
L
SS
S
C
o
m
p
o
si
te
Sm
al
l
F-
ST
M
N
ew
P
Y
SC
[7
4]
(n
+
2u
+
3
)|G
|
4
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2
n
+
5
)|G
|
(2
I
+
5
)e
x
p
7p
a
ir
+
2I
e
x
p
-
A
N
D
∗ +,
−
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
Y
L
L
+
[1
00
]
2
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2
I
+
2
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
|G
|+
|Z
∗ p
|
(2
I
+
3
)e
x
p
1e
x
p
(2
I
+
2
)p
a
ir
+
(I
+
1
)e
x
p
T
re
e
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
G
-R
O
M
-
LY
Z
L
[5
4]
(n
+
r
+
d
t
+
3
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(n
1
+
3
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(
+
r
+
d
2 t
+
2
)|G
|
(2
n
1
+
r
+
d
t
+
4
)e
x
p
(2
I
+
4
)p
a
ir
+
(I
+
r
+
d
t
)e
x
p
-
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
Z
C
L
+
14
[1
09
]
(4
n
+
2u
+
1
)|G
|
2
|G
|+
2
|G
T
|
(n
+
1
)|G
|
(2
I
+
5
)e
x
p
(r
+
2
)p
a
ir
2p
a
ir
A
N
D
∗ +,
−
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
FH
R
[1
7]
|G
0
|+
(n
+
1
)|G
1
|+
2
|G
T
|
2
|G
0
|+
2I
|G
1
|+
2
|G
T
|
3

|G
0
|+
|G
1
|
(2
I
+
2
)p
m
+
2e
x
p
(3
I
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
(n
+
4

+
7
)p
m
T
re
e
P
ri
m
e
Sm
al
l
F-
ST
M
D
B
D
H
C
D
L
Q
[1
4]
7
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(3
n
1
+
2
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
|Z
∗ p
|
(4
n
1
+
3
)e
x
p
1e
x
p
(3
I
+
2
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
Q
Z
Z
C
[7
6]
7
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(3
n
1
+
2
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
|G
|
(4
n
1
+
3
)e
x
p
2p
a
ir
(3
I
+
2
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
X
Y
M
[9
5]
5
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(3
n
1
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2

+
2
)|G
|
(5
n
1
+
2
)e
x
p
(6
I
+
1
)p
a
ir
+
2I
e
x
p
(5
I
+
2
)e
x
p
L
SS
S
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
S-
ST
M
q
-t
y
p
e
LY
H
+
[4
4]
3
|G
|+
|G
T
|
(2
I
+
1
)|G
|+
|G
T
|
(3
n
+
1
)|G
|
(2
I
+
2
)e
x
p
(3
I
+
2
)p
a
ir
+
I
e
x
p
(3
I
+
2
)e
x
p
T
re
e
P
ri
m
e
L
ar
g
e
S-
R
O
M
D
C
D
H
†
u
:t
h
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
u
se
rs
th
e
sy
st
em
h
as
;r
:t
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
re
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
ev
en
ts
;d
m
ax
:t
h
e
m
ax
im
u
m
le
n
g
th
o
f
th
e
la
b
el
st
ri
n
g
s;
d
t
:t
h
e
m
ax
im
u
m
d
ep
th
o
f
th
e
ti
m
e
tr
ee
.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 53, No. 4, Article 83. Publication date: August 2020.
Attribute-based Encryption for Cloud Computing Access Control: A Survey 83:17
Table 3. The Special Feature Comparison in Revocable CP-ABE Constructions
Schemes Key Technique Backward Secrecy Forward Secrecy
Re-keying Cost
Computation Cost Storage Cost
AI09a-1 [3] Broadcast Encryption ✗  - -
AI09a-2 [3] Broadcast Encryption ✗  - -
YWRL [104] Proxy Re-encryption   rattexp ratt |Z∗p |
HN [28] Proxy Re-encryption   (2I + 2)exp log  |Z∗p |
YJR [99] Proxy Re-encryption   2rattexp 2ratt |Z∗p |
LCL+ [36] Proxy Re-encryption   ruser (2dmax + 3)exp ruser (dmax + 2) |G1,3 | + ruser |Z∗p |
PYSC [74] Broadcast Encryption ✗  - -
YLL+ [100] Proxy-assisted Decryption   - -
LYZL [54] Broadcast Encryption ✗  - -
ZCL+14 [109] Broadcast Encryption with
Ciphertext Update
  r exp r |Z∗p |
FHR [17] System Public Key Update ✗  - -
CDLQ [14] Proxy-assisted Decryption   - -
QZZC [76] Proxy-assisted Decryption   - -
XYM [95] Proxy Re-encryption   ruser (4dt + 3)exp ruser (2dt + 2) |G |
LYH+ [44] Proxy Re-encryption   (n + 2u )exp 2 log n |G |
† ratt: the number of revoked attributes; ruser: the number of revoked users.
Fig. 5. The application scenario of accountable CP-ABE.
CP-ABE. Besides publishing system public keys (procedure (1)) and issuing attribute secret keys,
the AA is semi-trusted and generates a tracing key in accountable CP-ABE (procedure (2)). The
DO chooses an access policy A himself and integrates A into the ciphertext (procedure (3)). Then,
the DU obtains the ciphertext from the CSP to retrieve the original data based on his/her attribute
secret keys (procedure (4)). Once malicious behaviors exist, the corresponding entity should be
traced (procedure (5)) and then is judged by the auditor (procedure (6)).
It is noted that the functionality of accountability in CP-ABE is of importance in practical appli-
cations, because two types of key abuse issues exist. For one thing, the key abuse behavior of a user
should be traced to prevent framing other honest users who have the attribute set that is also held
by malicious users. For another, the illegal key re-distribution behavior of the AA should also be
accountable. Considering the example in Figure 5, if A=(Teacher OR (CS AND Student)), then the
ciphertext can be successfully decrypted by the DU with LA = {Teacher, Alice} and the DU with
LB = {Teacher, Bob}, while it cannot be decrypted by the DU with LC = {CE, Student, Carl}. Be-
cause Alice and Bob have the same attribute list, the key abuse behavior of Alice may be mistaken
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as that of Bob. Another case is Bob is framed due to the key re-distribution behavior of the AA. In
any case, the entity who misbehaves should be accountable by the auditor. The accountability of
CP-ABE has two categories: (1) Black-box accountability: only a decryption equipment is leaked.
In this case, given a decryption equipment as a black box, the entity who constructs the black box
can be specified by the auditor. (2) White-box accountability: the attribute secret key is directly
leaked. In this case, given an attribute secret key, the entity who leaks this key can be specified by
the auditor.
5.2 Syntax of Accountable CP-ABE
In a black-box accountable CP-ABE, the definitions of Encrypt and Decrypt are the same as those
of basic CP-ABE. Therefore, we only explain the other algorithms here.
• Setup(1λ ,u) → (TK , PK ,MK ): The AA will run this algorithm, and it is called the system
setup algorithm. After inputting λ and u, which represents the number the system’s users,
the algorithm returns the tracing key TK , PK , and MK .
• KeyGen(PK ,MK , i,L)→ SKi,L : The AA will run this algorithm to generate attribute secret
keys. After inputting PK , MK , an index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,u}, and L, the algorithm returns SKi,L
as the secret key corresponding to i and L.
• TraceD (PK ,TK ,L) → I: The tracing algorithm can be run by anyone. Given black-box ac-
cess to a key-like decryption box D, after inputting PK , the tracing keyTK , an attribute list
L, the algorithm returns I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,u} as an index set for specifying the malicious set.
Note that this definition defines public accountability. If the record of attribute secret keys
is involved, this algorithm correspondingly defines private accountability.
• Judge(·) → guilty or innocent: This is a protocol among the AA, the identified identity
i ∈ I, and the auditor. The AA inputs (PK ,MK ,D,TK ), the user inputs (PK , SKi,L ), and the
auditor inputs (PK ,D). The auditor will judge whether the user i is guilty.
For white-box accountable CP-ABE, the definitions of Setup, Encrypt, and Decrypt are the same
as those of basic CP-ABE. Here, we only explain the other algorithms.
• KeyGen(PK ,MK , ID,L) → SKI D,L : The AA will run this algorithm to generate attribute
secret keys. After inputting PK , MK , an identity ID, and L, the algorithm returns SKI D,L as
the secret key corresponding to ID and L.
• Trace(PK , SKI D,L )→ ID or: The tracing algorithm can be run by anyone. After inputting
PK and an attribute secret key SKI D,L , the algorithm first checks whether SKI D,L is well-
formed or not. If SKI D,L is well-formed, which means it can be used in a well-formed decryp-
tion process, the algorithm outputs ID to indicate that SKI D,L is linked to ID. Otherwise, it
outputs  to indicate that SKI D,L is invalid and there is no need to trace it. Note that this
definition defines weak public accountability. If the master key is involved, this algorithm
correspondingly defines private accountability.
• Judge(·) → guilty or innocent: This is an interactive protocol between a user with identity
ID and the auditor. When the user is identified as a malicious user by the system based on
the traced key SK∗I D,L , the user inputs (PK , SKI D,L ), and the auditor inputs (PK , SK
∗
I D,L )
and judges whether the user is guilty.
5.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
Accountable CP-ABE solutions are applied to establish accountable access control systems in
which the AA is semi-trusted. Similar to basic CP-ABE, accountable CP-ABE should satisfy
Data Confidentiality and Collusion Resistance in addition to accountability. On one hand, user
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accountability should be achieved to trace malicious users. For example, suppose A=(Teacher OR
(CS AND Student)), then the ciphertext can be decrypted by the DU with LA = {Teacher, Alice}
and the DU with LB = {Teacher, Bob} individually. If Alice maliciously leaks her secret key, the
auditor should decide Alice is guilty while Bob is not. On the other hand, authority accountability
should be enabled to trace the malicious key re-distribution behavior of the AA. For instance, if
the AA re-distributes the secret key to other users based on the attribute “Teacher,” it should not
be possible to frame Alice and Bob.
5.4 Research Status of Accountable CP-ABE
Li et al. [41] designed a CP-ABE solution supporting private user accountability in black-box mod-
els. The scheme has selective security in the ROM and only supports AND-gate policies.
To improve the expressiveness of access policies, Liu et al. [57] constructed an LSSS-based CP-
ABE solution supporting user accountability. However, the scheme is based on the white-box
model. Later, a new CP-ABE solution due to Liu et al. [58] can support the LSSS policy and re-
alize public black-box user accountability. Although the schemes of References [57, 58] have the
ability of resisting adaptive adversaries in standard models, they only support small attribute uni-
verse. To fill the above gap, Ning et al. [69] developed a CP-ABE solution to simultaneously realize
large universe and white-box user accountability by optimizing the accountability of the scheme
of Reference [57] even if its security analysis is based on the selective model.
The above schemes only realize accountability of malicious users, and the key redistribution
behavior of the attribute authority cannot be traced. To address this issue, Ning et al. [68] designed
an LSSS-based CP-ABE construction, which enables weak public accountability of both users and
the attribute authority in the white-box model by a Paillier-style encryption-based commitment.
The security proofs of the scheme are presented under new assumptions and the q-strong Diffie-
Hellman (q-SDH) assumption. However, Zhang et al. [113] showed a security weakness of the
scheme [68] by re-randomizing the attribute secret key and constructed an LSSS-based CP-ABE
scheme supporting the user and authority accountability with full security in the ROM in the
weak-public white-box model.
Ning et al. [66] further designed a black-box accountable LSSS-based CP-ABE solution by com-
bining conventional CP-ABE with anonymous identity-based encryption with identity hierarchies.
Full security and public user accountability are ensured in this scheme.
Liu et al. [61] described a large universe CP-ABE solution that simultaneously considered the
issues of direct user revocation and black-box public user accountability. In standard models, the
security analysis under q-type assumptions shows its selective security. To further realize cipher-
text updating, a new CP-ABE solution is constructed by Liu et al. [59], in which the ciphertexts
corresponding to the published revocation list are updated. In addition, the scheme simultaneously
supports white-box user accountability and direct user revocation.
Jiang et al. [29] solved the issue of key delegation abuse in CP-ABE and proposed a white-box
user-accountable CP-ABE solution of which the security analysis is given in generic group models.
Nevertheless, this solution only supports AND-gate policies and hence is less expressive than other
relevant schemes.
5.5 Comparison of Accountable CP-ABE Schemes
In Table 4, we make a comparison of accountable CP-ABE solutions according to the metrics used
in the comparison of basic CP-ABE. In addition, we add a new metric “accountability computation
cost” in Table 4. Obviously, the schemes of References [41, 69, 113] have a small and constant-size
system public key. The schemes of References [57, 58, 66, 68] enable the LSSS policy based on
composite-order groups and small universe. The schemes of References [41, 61, 69, 113] are large
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Fig. 6. The application scenario of policy-hiding CP-ABE.
universe constructions that can resist attacks from selective adversaries. Only the schemes of Ref-
erences [29, 41, 59, 69] are designed in prime order groups. However, the accountability of these
four schemes can only be performed by the attribute authority. Based on the state-of-the-art for
accountable CP-ABE, we know the black-box accountability is only realized in the schemes of Ref-
erences [41, 58, 61, 66], in which the scheme of Reference [41] achieves private user accountability
and the schemes of References [58, 61, 66] enable public user accountability. Only the schemes of
References [68, 113] simultaneously realize the accountability of both users and the authority even
if it is based on the weak-public white-box model. Accordingly, if user accountability, authority
accountability, and large universe are required simultaneously, the scheme of Reference [113] is
preferred.
6 POLICY-HIDING CP-ABE
6.1 Application Scenario: Policy-hiding Fine-grained Access Control
Figure 6 shows fine-grained access control with attribute privacy protection based on policy-hiding
CP-ABE. Usually, the system involves four entities: the AA, the CSP, the DO, and the DU, and
they play the same roles as those in basic CP-ABE. It is noted that policy-hiding CP-ABE can
be categorized into fully hiding CP-ABE schemes and partially hiding CP-ABE schemes. In fully
hiding CP-ABE, no information about the the access policy’s attribute information is revealed. In
partially hiding CP-ABE, sensitive attribute values that are involved in policies are hidden while
the corresponding attribute names are made public similar to the ciphertext. Currently, fully hiding
CP-ABE can only be indirectly constructed based on threshold policies and attribute-hiding inner-
product encryption. Particularly, in existing literatures, there are no concrete fully hiding CP-
ABE solutions. Therefore, in the subsequent description, we directly use the term “policy-hiding”
instead of “partially hiding.”
In access control systems with fine granularity and hidden access policies, the procedures (1),
(2), (3), and (4) are similar to those of basic fine-grained access control except that the access
policy is hidden in the procedures (3) and (4). Specifically, to realize attribute privacy protection,
the chosen policy will be embedded in the ciphertext in a privacy-aware manner such that a third
party including the CSP is not able to read the access policy. This is especially true in the fields of
military, commerce, and healthcare.
For instance, suppose the DO encrypts a health record under access policy A=((Affiliation: City
Hospital AND Department: Respiratory) OR (SSN: 321-54-6789 AND Status: Normal)), and the ci-
phertext is outsourced to the CSP. Note that everyone including the CSP can read the access policy
and may figure out that the user with Social Security number 321-54-6789 possibly suffers a res-
piratory problem. In this case, the privacy of the user is leaked, which reflects the significance of
concealing the access policy. As shown in Figure 6, in policy-hiding CP-ABE, the attributes that
are tied to the leaf nodes in the tree policy are hidden.
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6.2 Syntax of Policy-hiding CP-ABE
In a policy-hiding CP-ABE solution, there are algorithms including Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and
Decrypt. Note that the definitions of the first two algorithms are similar to those of basic CP-ABE.
• Encrypt(PK ,M,A) → CTA: It is adopted by the DO to generate ciphertexts. The DO first
chooses an access policyA, then he takes PK andM as inputs to returnCTA as the ciphertext
of M while hiding A, which will be stored on the CSP.
• Decrypt(PK ,CTA, SKL ) → M or ⊥: This algorithm is adopted by the DU to recover mes-
sages. After inputting PK , CTA of M without knowing A, and SKL with regard to L, it
returns M if L |= A, and otherwise outputs ⊥ to indicate an error.
Remark 1. To improve the decryption efficiency in policy-hiding CP-ABE, previous schemes [35,
110] introduce the idea of anonymous attribute matching and divide the decryption algorithm into
two phases including matching phase and decryption phase.
6.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
Anonymous access control systems can be realized through policy-hiding CP-ABE, in which the
AA is trusted and the CSP will be honest-but-curious. Similar to basic CP-ABE, policy-hiding CP-
ABE should also satisfy Data Confidentiality and Collusion Resistance. In addition, the access policy
should be protected in policy-hiding access control systems. For instance, when recorded health
data are encrypted by the DO using a policy-hiding CP-ABE solution, the chosen access policy is
hidden and tied to the corresponding ciphertext with the form (Affiliation: ∗ AND Department: ∗)
OR (SSN: ∗ AND Status: ∗) while the concrete values are replaced with “*”.
6.4 Research Status of Policy-hiding CP-ABE
Based on Reference [12], Nishide et al. [70] designed a policy-hiding CP-ABE solution of which
the security is based on ROM under the DBDH and DLIN assumptions. However, the scheme only
realizes selective security. To further realize full security against adaptive adversaries, Lai et al.
[34] designed a CP-ABE solution in groups of composite order that is fully secure under new
assumptions. Nevertheless, the schemes of References [34, 70] only support AND-gate policies
and hence are less expressive. In addition, the schemes are small-universe constructions, and the
ciphertext length is linearly related to the total number of attribute values.
To achieve expressiveness, Lai et al. [35] developed a CP-ABE construction based on Refer-
ence [37] with LSSS policies. The dual system encryption technique [92] is applied to give the
security analysis. To improve the decryption efficiency in policy-hiding CP-ABE, Zhang et al.
[110] designed a new policy-hiding CP-ABE solution in which an attribute-matching process is
performed before full decryption. The key idea lies in that exclusive ciphertext components are
utilized to test whether the attribute list satisfies the hidden policy without needing decryption.
The test is computationally efficient compared with full decryption.
Hur [26] proposed a tree-based policy-hiding CP-ABE solution for realizing secure and privacy-
preserving data sharing in smart grid. The idea in essence is to obfuscate attributes in the access
tree by updating the plain attributes assigned to each leaf node with a hash value. In addition, the
scheme is able to outsource laborious decryption overhead to the CSP. However, the disadvantage
of the scheme is the lack of formal security proofs. Zhou et al. [119] developed a policy-hiding
CP-ABE construction that can compress the ciphertext length to a constant. The scheme enables
AND-gate policies and obtains provable security under the q-type assumption. To hide AND-gate
policies, the scheme due to Phuong et al. [73] transforms attributes and access policies to two
vectors and then hides the access policy based on the idea of inner product encryption.
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Fig. 7. The application scenario of CP-ABE with policy updating.
For better performance, Zhang et al. [111] designed a policy-hiding CP-ABE solution in which
only several bilinear pairings in decryption are required. However, the expressiveness of the
scheme needs to be improved. Qiu et al. [77] designed an AND-gate CP-ABE solution to hide
access policies and enable keyword search. The scheme has selective security in generic group
models.
To simultaneously improve expressiveness and computation efficiency, Zhang et al. [117] con-
structed a policy-hiding large-universe CP-ABE scheme that supports LSSS policies. In particular,
the attribute matching process only needs two bilinear pairings and the scheme’s full security is
demonstrated in standard models. Very recently, the scheme of Reference [117] is improved in
Reference [107] to achieve better decryption efficiency. Xiong et al. [94] designed a fine-grained
broadcast encryption scheme supporting hidden LSSS policies. However, the user still needs to
perform expensive bilinear pairing operations even if the outsourced computation technique is
used.
6.5 Comparison of Policy-hiding CP-ABE Schemes
We compare policy-hiding CP-ABE schemes in Table 5 with regard to the metrics used in the
comparison of basic CP-ABE schemes. A different point is that the decryption cost is divided into
“matching phase” and “decryption phase” in Table 5. It easily follows that the schemes of Ref-
erences [26, 107, 110, 111, 117] support large universe and only the schemes of References [34,
35, 107, 117] are capable of resisting adaptive adversaries in standard models. Only the scheme
of Reference [119] has a constant-size ciphertext even if its encryption algorithm involves bilin-
ear pairing operations. As for the decryption cost, the schemes of References [26, 107, 110, 111,
117] realize efficient attribute matching, because the computation cost is not affected by the access
policy’s complexity. Only the schemes of References [26, 107, 111] enable constant computation
overhead for decryption. As for the expressiveness of access policies, only the schemes of Refer-
ences [35, 107, 117] support the expressive LSSS policies. The schemes of References [70, 73, 77,
119] are small universe constructions based on prime order groups. Based on the state-of-the-art
for policy-hiding CP-ABE, we know only the scheme of Reference [26] further realizes outsourced
decryption, and the rest of policy-hiding CP-ABE constructions cannot support other functionali-
ties. In general, the schemes of References [107, 117] are suitable for attribute-based and privacy-
aware access control in the setting of mobile clouds considering the decryption performance and
full security.
7 CP-ABE WITH POLICY UPDATING
7.1 Application Scenario: Fine-grained and Policy Updating Access Control
As shown in Figure 7, CP-ABE with policy updating, in which the technique of proxy re-encryption
is usually involved, can be applied to enable policy updating access control systems with fine
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granularity. The access control system involves five entities: the AA, the CSP, the DO, the DU,
and the proxy. The AA is trusted, and the CSP and the proxy are honest-but-curious. In policy
updating access control systems, the procedures (1), (2), and (3) are similar to those of basic fine-
grained access control. CP-ABE with policy updating allows the proxy to help users to recover
messages from ciphertexts, even if the original access policy is not matched by the attribute list.
Specifically, based on an update key (procedure (4)) from another user whose attributes satisfy
the original policy, the proxy can transform the ciphertext to a new one with an updated policy
(procedures (5.1) and (5.2)). Finally, the ciphertext with the updated policy can be decrypted by the
user (procedure (6)). Considering the example in Figure 7, if A=(Teacher OR (CS AND Student)),
then the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted by DU1 with attribute list LA = {Teacher, Alice},
while it cannot be decrypted by DU2 with attribute list LB = {CE, Student, Bob}. If DU1 is going
on holiday, she can delegate DU2 in advance to decrypt on her behalf. To achieve this goal, DU1
just gives an update key to the proxy who takes charge of updating the ciphertext intended for
DU1. The update key is then used by the proxy to update the underlying policy in the original
ciphertext such that DU2 can successfully recover the message in the updated ciphertext.
7.2 Syntax of CP-ABE with Policy Updating
A CP-ABE scheme supporting policy updating comprise algorithms including Setup, KeyGen, En-
crypt, the update key generation algorithm UKeyGen, the ciphertext updating algorithm Update,
and Decrypt. Note that the first three algorithms have the identical definitions to those of basic
CP-ABE.
• UKeyGen(PK , SKL,A′)→ UKL→A′ : After inputting PK , a secret key SKL corresponding to
L and A′, the algorithm returns an update key UKL→A′ , where L represents the attribute
list of DU1 and A′ is satisfied by the attributes of DU2.
• Update(PK ,UKL→A′,CTA) → CTA′ : After inputting PK , an update key UKL→A′ and a ci-
phertextCTA, if and only if L |= A, the algorithm generates a ciphertextCTA′ with A′ acting
as the access policy and the plaintext being the same as that ofCTA. That is, the access policy
is updated from A to A′.
• Decrypt(PK ,CTA, SKL ) → M or ⊥: The DU (DU1 or DU2) takes as inputs PK , CTA of M
with regard to A, and SKL in which L is integrated, and returns M if and only if L |= A.
Note that if CTA is the original (respectively, updated) ciphertext, it is decrypted by DU1
(respectively, DU2).
7.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
CP-ABE with policy updating should satisfy Data Confidentiality and Collusion Resistance. In addi-
tion, because the honest-but-curious proxy is introduced and the updated ciphertexts exist, Master
Key Security should be realized. To be specific, even if the proxy colludes with DU2, it is infeasible
for them to learn of secret keys of DU1. For example, if A=(Teacher OR (CS AND Student)) and
A′=(Teacher OR (CE AND Student)), the proxy can transform the ciphertext CTA to CTA′ by up-
dating the access policy from A to A′ based on the update keyUKL→A′ , where L |= A. Obviously,
even if DU2 cannot decryptCTA, he is capable of decrypting A
′. Based on Master Key Security, the
secret key of DU1 is protected from the collusion attack of the proxy and DU2.
7.4 Research Status of CP-ABE with Policy Updating
Based on Reference [12], Liang et al. [50] developed a CP-ABE solution that enables policy
updating through the technique of proxy re-encryption. More precisely, this construction is a
ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption scheme, denoted by CP-ABPRE for short,
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which is proven selectively secure. The CP-ABPRE construction due to Luo et al. [62] is a small-
universe solution and the policy supports multiple attribute values and wildcards in the form of
AND denoted by AND∗m . The security proofs of the scheme are presented in standard models under
the DBDH and the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) assumptions. Liu et al. [55] in-
troduced a new CP-ABPRE solution in which time is taken into account. The main idea lies in that
both a disjunctive normal form (DNF) access policy and time are embedded into the ciphertext. In
addition, each user has an attribute list and time. The security proofs are based on ROM under the
complexity assumption BDH. Liang et al. [49] designed a more expressive CP-ABPRE solution by
the technique of dual system encryption. The scheme adopts groups of composite order and is able
to resist adaptive attacks in standard models. Yang et al. [101] designed a new CP-ABPRE solution
that is a tree-based construction. The scheme enables constant-size attribute secret key based on
the technique of proxy re-encryption, and its security analysis involves generic group models.
To support attribute privacy protection and policy updating at the same time, Zhang et al. [112]
formalized the notion of anonymous CP-ABPRE for the first time and proposed a concrete scheme.
In the scheme, a technique named as “match-then-re-encrypt” is proposed to help the proxy check
whether a ciphertext should be transformed without requiring the access policy. Security proofs
of the scheme are presented without needing the ROM under the assumptions DBDH, DLIN, and
CBDH. Jiang et al. [30] developed a CP-ABE construction with policy updating and attribute revo-
cation. The ciphertext for user decryption is of constant length. The scheme supports AND-gate
policies and is proven selectively secure. Yeh et al. [102] designed an attribute-based health records
access control system, in which the techniques of CP-ABE, proxy re-encryption, and Merkle hash
trees are used. The policy updating is realized by updating the involved attributes in the ciphertext.
7.5 Comparison of CP-ABE Schemes with Policy Updating
We compare CP-ABE solutions with policy updating in Table 6 in terms of the metrics used in
the comparison of basic CP-ABE schemes. In addition, we further consider the update server-side
computation cost for one update in Table 6. We know that only the scheme of Reference [101]
has constant-size system public key and hence supports large universe. However, generic group
models are involved in the security analysis. Only the schemes of References [30, 55, 101] have
constant decryption cost, which is not affected by the complexity of access policies. In particular,
the ciphertext of the scheme of Reference [30] is constant-size. The scheme of Reference [49] is
more expressive than other schemes even if composite-order groups are adopted in the concrete
design. The schemes of References [30, 49, 50, 62, 112] have security in the standard model. In par-
ticular, based on the state-of-the-art for CP-ABE with policy updating, we know only the scheme
of Reference [112] realizes privacy-aware policy updating; that is, the access policy is hidden and
can be updated by the proxy. Therefore, in sensitive applications such as attribute-based medical
health access control systems, the scheme of Reference [112] can be adopted. In resource-limited
applications, the schemes of References [30, 55, 101] are preferred.
8 MULTI-AUTHORITY CP-ABE
8.1 Application Scenario: Multi-authority Fine-grained Access Control
Figure 8 illustrates that multi-authority CP-ABE can enable distributed and access control with
fine granularity. The access control system involves five entities: the central authority (CA), the
AAs, the CSP, the DO, and the DU. Usually, the CA is completely trustworthy and publishes system
public keys. Each AA is responsible for an attribute set, and any user can apply for corresponding
secret keys from AAs. In multi-authority fine-grained access control systems, the procedures (1)
and (2) are similar to those of basic fine-grained access control. In addition, the DU obtains a
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Fig. 8. The application scenario of multi-authority CP-ABE.
central secret key associated with his/her global identity from the CA (procedure (3)). The DO
outsources ciphertexts of original messages to the CSP under an access policy over attributes from
different AAs (procedure (4)). Finally, the DU can obtain the ciphertext from the CSP to recover the
corresponding message based on secret keys (procedure (5)). For example, as shown in Figure 8,
A=((AA1:Teacher AND AA2:University) OR (AA1:Doctor AND AA3:City A)), and the ciphertext
will be successfully decrypted by the DU with LA = {Teacher, University, Alice}, while it cannot
be decrypted by the DU with LB = {Teacher, City A, Bob}. The attributes “Teacher” and “Doctor”
are managed by AA1, the attribute “University” is managed by AA2, and the attribute “City A” is
managed by AA3. It is noted that the CA in some multi-authority CP-ABE schemes is removed and
these schemes are called decentralized CP-ABE. Because traditional multi-authority CP-ABE has
the key-escrow problem due to the CA, decentralized CP-ABE is preferable for designing access
control systems with fine granularity.
8.2 Syntax of Multi-authority CP-ABE
The algorithms Setup, AAKeyGen, CAKeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt are the key ingredients of a
multi-authority CP-ABE solution. It is noted that the definitions of Encrypt and Decrypt are the
same as those of basic CP-ABE except that the attributes in access policies and secret keys are from
different AAs. In the following, we present the other algorithms:
• Setup(1λ ) → ({pkk , skk }1≤k≤K , PK ,MK ): This algorithm is called the system setup algo-
rithm, which will be run by the CA. After inputting λ, the algorithm returns (ppk , skk ) as
a public and secret key pair of AAk with 1 ≤ k ≤ K . It additionally outputs PK and MK
where PK is publicly published and MK is secretly maintained by the CA.
• AAKeyGen(PK , skk ,GID,L(k ) ) → SKL (k ) : This algorithm is called the attribute secret key
generation algorithm, which will be run by the AAs. After inputting PK , the AAk ’s secret
key skk , a user’s global identity GID, and L
(k ) as an attribute list of which the attributes
are managed by AAk , the algorithm outputs the secret key SKL (k ) corresponding to L
(k ) . If
the user GID’s attribute list is L = {L(k ) }k ∈I , then SKL = {SKL (k ) }k ∈I acts as attribute secret
keys, where I represents the index set of AAs of which the attribute domains include the
user’s attributes.
• CAKeyGen(PK ,MK ,GID) → SKC : This algorithm is called the central key generation al-
gorithm, which will be run by the CA. After inputting PK , MK , and GID, the algorithm
outputs SKC as the user GID’s central secret key.
Remark 2. In decentralized CP-ABE, the public and secret key pairs of AAs are generated by
themselves and the central key generation algorithm is no longer needed. The definition of the
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algorithm for generating attribute secret key is the same with that of the above CA enabled multi-
authority CP-ABE.
8.3 Adversarial Model and Security Goals
Similar to basic CP-ABE, multi-authority CP-ABE should also satisfy Data Confidentiality and
Collusion Resistance. The difference lies in that Collusion Resistance further considers the at-
tributes of DUs from different AAs. For example, suppose A=((AA1:Teacher AND AA2:University)
OR (AA1:Doctor AND AA3:City A)), then the ciphertext cannot be decrypted by the DU with
LB = {Teacher, City A, Bob} and the DU with LC = {Doctor, City B, Carl} individually. Even if Bob
and Carl collude by combining their secret keys, they should not succeed in decrypting the cipher-
text under A. In addition, multi-authority CP-ABE should take the AA corruption issue into ac-
count. Certainly, the upper bound of allowed corrupted AAs is usually less than the total number
of AAs. It is indispensable to design multi-authority CP-ABE schemes with the upper bound as
large as possible.
8.4 Research Status of Multi-authority CP-ABE
Chase [10] designed a multi-authority ABE construction on the groups of prime order. In the
scheme, a CA and multiple AAs exist. The CA is in charge of issuing seeds for each AA, which
further generates attribute-related keys of users. However, the CA is endowed with a super power
in the system such that it is capable of decrypting any possible ciphertext. Thus, it may become
the system security vulnerability.
Aiming to remove such trusted CA and prevent the colluding AAs from pooling their informa-
tion on a particular user, Chase et al. [11] first designed an anonymous key distribution mechanism
and then gave a multi-authority CP-ABE solution, where no CA exists and each pair of AAs shares
secret pseudorandom functions (PRF) seeds in the initialization phase. The scheme is secure if at
most na − 2 AAs are corrupted, where na denotes the number of involved AAs. Lin et al. [52]
considered the problem of incorrect key distribution in the multi-authority setting and introduced
several threshold multi-authority ABE schemes without a trusted CA. Their basic CP-ABE scheme
is secure against at most  na2 − 1 AAs’ corruption.
Different from the selective security in References [10, 11, 52], for the first time, Lewko and
Waters [38] designed a fully secure decentralized CP-ABE solution on the groups of composite
order in the ROM without needing cooperations among multiple AAs. The employed access policy
can be described by any LSSS matrix. To achieve adaptive security in standard models, Liu et al.
[56] developed a multi-authority CP-ABE solution on composite-order groups with multiple CAs
and AAs. These different authorities are responsible for generating keys for users that are related
to identities and attributes, respectively.
To alleviate the computation overhead caused by multiple CAs, a multi-authority CP-ABE so-
lution with a CA and AAs in cloud storage is developed by Li et al. [48]. In contrast to that of Ref-
erence [10], the CA in this scheme is employed to issue identity-related keys and cannot decrypt
any ciphertext. Similar to that in Reference [56], the scheme’s security proofs are given in stan-
dard models by the technique of dual system encryption. Li et al. [47] showed how to deploy the
multi-authority ABE [11] to realize secure health record access control. This scheme also supports
indirect user and attribute revocation and no CA exists. Considering the user’s privacy concerns
of both identity and attributes, Han et al. [23] gave a privacy-preserving solution by combining a
key extract protocol with decentralized CP-ABE, where no CA exists and there is no requirement
of interactions among AAs. Besides, any AA is allowed to dynamically join or leave without re-
initializing the access control system. Jung et al. [31] simultaneously addressed the issues of data
confidentiality and user identity privacy and proposed a semi-anonymous privilege control scheme
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and further extended it to support full anonymity by leveraging the oblivious transfer technique.
This scheme does not need CAs and is proved to be secure if at least two AAs are not corrupted.
Rouselakis and Waters [79] designed an LSSS-based large-universe decentralized CP-ABE solu-
tion with selective security in the ROM. Cui and Deng [13] investigated the attribute revocation
issue, which is challenging and important in decentralized CP-ABE. The AAs periodically update
the attribute-related key components, and the revoked users cannot obtain the new keys. To pre-
vent collusion attacks, a user’s attribute secret key components are tied up with a time attribute
and his/her identifiers. Although the key generation task is assigned to multiple AAs, the drawback
of single-point failure still exists, since each AA governs a partial and disjoint attribute universe
of the system. To tackle this technical challenge, Xue et al. [98] presented a robust and auditable
multi-authority CP-ABE solution, where the total system attribute universe is managed by mul-
tiple AAs, each of which can independently generate secret keys of any possible attribute set for
users. The malicious behaviors of AAs can also be detected by a CA. The decentralized CP-ABE
solution due to Zhang et al. [106] is a large-universe construction that adopts prime order groups
while enabling traceability in the sensing of white box. Any malicious user who deliberately leaks
his/her partial/modified keys would be precisely identified. Yu et al. [103] designed a decentralized
CP-ABE solution that can revoke malicious users in a direct way. In the revocation phase, both the
related public parameters and ciphertext components are updated, and the keys of remaining users
are not required to update. A verifiable revocation mechanism is designed to detect if the target
ciphertext has been correctly updated by the cloud server.
8.5 Comparison of Multi-authority CP-ABE Schemes
Table 7 compares the numeric results and characteristics among multi-authority CP-ABE construc-
tions. The column named AA Corruption shows the upper bound of allowed corrupted AAs of the
corresponding scheme. It is obvious that only one exponent operation is required in Reference
[48] by employing an efficient outsourced approach. The schemes of References [10, 11, 23, 31,
47, 52, 98, 103] adopt prime order groups and are proven secure in the standard model. The large
attribute universe is only supported by the schemes of References [79, 106]. Only the schemes of
References [13, 38, 48, 56] achieve full security, in which the security proofs of the schemes of Ref-
erences [48, 56] are based on standard models. Based on the state-of-the-art for multi-authority
CP-ABE, we know the schemes of References [11, 13, 23, 31, 38, 47, 52, 79, 103, 106] are decen-
tralized, among which the multiple AAs in References [11, 31, 47] need to cooperate to initialize
the system. The architecture of schemes of References [10, 48, 98] requires a CA and the scheme
of Reference [56] needs multiple CAs. Specifically, the CA in References [10, 98] can decrypt any
possible ciphertext and it may be the system security bottleneck. Every AA in Reference [98] is
responsible for governing all of the attributes in the system, while each AA in the other schemes
can only manage a disjoint subset of the system attribute universe. The schemes of References [13,
23, 38, 48, 56, 79, 103, 106] are secure if at least one of the AAs is not corrupted by the adversary.
Due to the fact that the AAs need to cooperate with each other to set up the system, the schemes
of References [11, 31, 47] are secure against at most na − 2 AAs’ corruption. Generally, if both full
security and decentralization are required, the schemes of References [13, 38] are preferred.
9 HIERARCHICAL CP-ABE
In this section, we present the application scenario of hierarchical CP-ABE: hierarchical fine-
grained access control. More details including the syntax, the adversarial model and security goals,
the research status, and comparisons of hierarchical CP-ABE are given in the Supplemental Mate-
rial A.
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Fig. 9. The application scenario of hierarchical CP-ABE.
Application Scenario: Hierarchical CP-ABE can be adopted in realizing hierarchical access con-
trol with fine granularity as shown in Figure 9. The access control system involves four types
of entities: the AAs, the CSP, the DO, and the DU. Compared with basic CP-ABE, the difference
lies in that there are many AAs and they are in a hierarchical organization. An AA may act as
a DU in hierarchical CP-ABE. Each higher-level AA delegates its own lower-level AAs by issu-
ing them master keys or secret keys associated with key structures. Note that a key structure in
hierarchical CP-ABE is a set associated with attributes. However, the key structure is different
from the attribute list in that each element in the key structure can still be an attribute set [88,
89]. Each lower-level AA trusts its own high-level AA. Similar to the AA in basic CP-ABE, the
top-level AA is completely trustworthy in hierarchical CP-ABE. In hierarchical attribute-based
access control systems, the top-level AA publishes the system public keys (procedure (1)) and
issues lower-level master keys for lower-level AAs based on corresponding key structures (pro-
cedure (2)). The DU can obtain attribute secret keys associated with his/her key structures from
the corresponding AA (procedure (3)). The DO outsources ciphertexts of messages to the CSP
under a specified policy (procedure (4)). If a given ciphertext can be decrypted by a user (pro-
cedure (5)), then other higher-level users including AAs can also succeed in decrypting the ci-
phertext. For example, as shown in Figure 9, A=((Project 1 AND Engineer) OR (Project 2 AND
Manager)), and the ciphertext can be successfully decrypted by the DU Bob with the key structure
KSB = {Project 1, Engineer}, while it cannot be decrypted by the DU Carl with the key struc-
ture KSC = {Project 2, Engineer}. In addition, hierarchical CP-ABE allows the DU Alice with the
key structureKSA = {Company,Department Manager,KSB ,KSC } to decrypt the ciphertext, which
makes sense, because the company’s department manager Alice indeed has the privilege to decrypt
the ciphertext in practice. In other words, the company’s department manager delegates the engi-
neers of the project 1 to decrypt the ciphertext.
10 ONLINE/OFFLINE CP-ABE
In this section, we present the application scenario of online/offline CP-ABE: fine-grained access
control with offline computation. The syntax, the adversarial model and security goals, the re-
search status, and comparisons of online/offline CP-ABE are given in the Supplemental Material
B.
Application Scenario: Figure 10 shows that CP-ABE with offline computation can be utilized to
design fine-grained access control mechanisms for resource-constrained data owners in the setting
of mobile cloud computing. Similar to the scenario of basic CP-ABE, the system involves the AA,
the CSP, the DO, and the DU, in which the AA is completely trustworthy. In fine-grained access
control systems with offline computation, the AA publishes the system public keys (procedure (1))
and generates offline keys named immediate attribute secret keys (procedure (2)) in the offline
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Fig. 10. The application scenario of online/offline CP-ABE.
Fig. 11. The application scenario of outsourced CP-ABE.
phase. In the online phase of key generation, the AA issues attribute secret keys to each DU based
on his/her corresponding attribute list (procedure (3)). The computational task for encryption can
be finished by the DO even if the access policy and message are not determined (procedure (4)).
Hence, once the message is given, the DO can efficiently generate the corresponding ciphertext in
the online phase (procedure (5)). Finally, the DU can decrypt the ciphertext to retrieve the original
message based on his/her attribute secret keys (procedure (6)). To improve the efficiency of key
distribution, the AA does the vast majority of the work for generating attribute secret keys offline,
before knowing the DU’s attribute list. Therefore, online/offline CP-ABE can be utilized to enable
large-scale access control with resource-constrained data owners.
11 OUTSOURCED CP-ABE
In this section, we present the application scenario of outsourced CP-ABE: fine-grained access
control with outsourced computation. More details including the syntax, the adversarial model
and security goals, the research status, and comparisons of outsourced CP-ABE are given in the
Supplemental Material C.
Application Scenario: Figure 11 shows that CP-ABE with outsourced computation can be used
to design access control mechanisms for resource-constrained users in mobile clouds. For access
control systems from outsourced CP-ABE construction, the involved entities include the AA, the
CSP, the DO, the DU, and the key generation service provider (KGSP) where the CSP consists
of the decryption service provider (DSP) and the storage service provider (SSP). Similar to basic
CP-ABE, only the AA is completely trustworthy. In fine-grained access control systems with out-
sourced computation, the AA first publishes the system public keys (procedure (1)). Then, the AA
outsources the computation in key generation to the KGSP (procedure (2.1)) to generate attribute
secret keys for the DU (procedure (2.2)). The DO outsources ciphertexts of messages to the SSP of
the CSP under a specified policy (procedure (3)). The DU is capable of outsourcing the main decryp-
tion task to the DSP. Based on the partially decrypted ciphertext (procedure (4)) that is generated
by the DSP, the original message will be finally recovered by the DU with small computation cost
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Table 8. Comprehensive Feature Comparison of CP-ABE Constructions
based on his/her attribute secret keys (procedure (5)). Because the AA can outsource the majority
of key generation tasks to the KGSP to improve the system efficiency, outsourced CP-ABE enables
large-scale access control systems with resource-limited users.
Each type of CP-ABE has heretofore been reviewed in Sections 3–11. As we know, a concrete
CP-ABE scheme can fall into different categories simultaneously. To clearly show the cryptograph-
ically functional features of each CP-ABE scheme, Table 8 makes a comprehensive feature compar-
ison of CP-ABE schemes following the features shown in Figure 2. These features are not present
in the basic CP-ABE schemes, and they are realized in enhanced CP-ABE shown in gray cells in
Table 8. Because each CP-ABE scheme has been reviewed in the corresponding section, Table 8
only shows the concrete feature comparison. Obviously, all the features of a given CP-ABE scheme
can be easily specified, which is exactly the purpose of presenting Table 8.
12 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Cloud computing is today the dominant computing paradigm that makes it possible for anyone
to access dynamic resources in a flexible manner. As a significant one-to-many cryptographic
technique, ABE successfully tackles the security and privacy issues in outsourced data and hence
is suitable for cloud computing access control. This survey provided a comprehensive overview of
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the state-of-the-art in ABE. First, we proposed a taxonomy, in which ABE is classified into CP-ABE,
KP-ABE, anti-quantum ABE, and generic ABE. As a major part of this survey, CP-ABE further falls
into nine subcategories including basic CP-ABE schemes, revocable CP-ABE schemes, accountable
CP-ABE schemes, policy-hiding CP-ABE schemes, CP-ABE schemes with policy updating, multi-
authority CP-ABE schemes, hierarchical CP-ABE schemes, online/offline CP-ABE schemes, and
outsourced CP-ABE schemes. In addition, we proposed a comprehensive and holistic assessment
criteria for ABE. Then, each type of CP-ABE and KP-ABE were methodically analyzed based on
the access control application scenario, the specification, the adversarial model, the security goal,
the design strategies, and features. To illustrate the advantages and drawbacks of ABE schemes,
we made detailed comparisons based on the proposed assessment criteria with respect to security
and performance. Finally, for the sake of large-scale deployments of cloud platforms in the future,
we pointed out that much exploration is needed for mature ABE technologies.
There are a lot of challenging and interesting problems in the ABE research.
• Fully-secure and expressive ABE solutions on prime order groups in standard models: As men-
tioned previously, fully secure ABE is more advantageous than selectively secure ABE, be-
cause it does not require adversaries to specify their target access policies or attribute lists
until receiving the system public keys [37]. Existing fully secure ABE solutions are usu-
ally designed on composite-order groups, and dual system encryption [92] and complex
assumptions are involved in the security proofs [37, 39, 117]. ABE schemes on composite-
order groups are less efficient than those on prime order groups because of larger param-
eters. In addition, dual system encryption is complicated in that semi-functional keys, and
ciphertexts need to be constructed in the proof of security [92]. A few existing fully secure
ABE schemes in prime order groups suffer from the drawbacks of low efficiency, less ex-
pressive access policies, or using random oracle models [1, 37]. Therefore, it is necessary
to design fully secure and expressive ABE schemes on prime order groups in the standard
model.
• Efficient ABE schemes without pairings: Typical cryptographic operations include the bi-
linear pairing, the exponentiation, the point multiplication and arithmetic operations in
groups, and so on. The computational complexity of the bilinear pairing is larger than that
of other operations [82]. However, bilinear pairings are required in most of the existing
ABE schemes, such as revocable ABE [76], accountable ABE [29], policy-hiding ABE [117],
ABE with policy updating [112], and multi-authority ABE [103]. Compared to the sym-
metric and traditional public-key encryption, ABE suffers from the disadvantage of high
computational cost because of the frequent pairing operations. For the practicality of ABE
in resource-constrained scenarios exemplified by sensor-based sensitive data collection, it
is meaningful to design efficient ABE schemes without pairings.
• Expressive ABE schemes with as many functionalities as possible: As mentioned earlier, func-
tionalities such as revocation, accountability, attribute privacy protection, policy updat-
ing, decentralization, and key hierarchy are very important for practical deployments of
ABE-based access control systems. As for revocation, the scheme of Reference [109] re-
alizes direct attribute and user revocation, whereas it only supports AND-gate policies. It
remains an open problem to design attribute directly revocable LSSS-based ABE schemes
with backward and forward secrecy. Previous accountable ABE schemes suffer from several
drawbacks such as the AND-gate policy [29, 41] and selective security [59]. Particularly, de-
centralization is not considered in accountable ABE. Existing policy-hiding ABE schemes
involve either the AND-gate policy or composite-order groups [70, 117]. ABE schemes with
policy updating cannot support attribute revocation [49, 112]. The issues of revocation and
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accountability have not been well addressed in decentralized ABE [38] and hierarchical ABE
[45]. In general, it would be interesting to construct expressive ABE schemes with as many
functionalities as possible.
• Efficient anti-quantum ABE: With the technical advancements of quantum computation, it
has been widely accepted that many public-key encryption schemes including ABE need se-
curity enhancements to resist possible quantum attacks. Although lattice-based algorithms
can resist quantum attacks, there are only a few lattice-based ABE constructions [9, 105]
that are selectively secure. In addition, lattice-based schemes lack practicability, because
they have only been considered secure for inefficiently large parameters. Accordingly, more
attention should be paid to anti-quantum ABE of better performance in the long term.
• New methodologies for the security proof of ABE: As two important proof techniques in
public-key cryptography, partitioning [8] and dual system encryption [92] have been widely
adopted by researchers. In a partitioning-based security proof of ABE, the target access pol-
icy or attribute list is partitioned into two parts. These two parts are, respectively, used to
create attribute private keys and the challenge ciphertext [21, 96]. Although the partition-
ing technique has been proved useful in selective security, it is inadequate for proving full
security of ABE [92]. The fundamental problem lies in that the access policy of ABE is com-
plex, which makes the partitioning technique unusable. To overcome this obstacle, the proof
technique of dual system encryption is introduced [92]. In the dual system encryption tech-
nique, ciphertexts and keys take on two forms: normal or semi-functional. Semi-functional
ciphertexts and keys are only used in security proofs. A semi-functional ciphertext can-
not be decrypted by a semi-functional key. In the security proof of ABE, the dual system
encryption technique usually relies on composite-order groups to prove full security and
hence has a performance limitation [37, 117]. Generally, to tackle the above challenges, it
is interesting to explore new methodologies for security proof of ABE. The achievement in
proof methods will promote more secure and efficient designs of ABE.
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